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008			240718s2022 xxu gob 001 0 eng
020			_a9780197610015 _cGBP163.01 _q(e-book)
024	7		_2DOI: _ahttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.001.0001
040			_beng _cIN-MiVU
082	0	4	_221 _a192 _bSHA/W
100	1		_aShaw, James R., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aWittgenstein on rules : _bJustification, grammar, and agreement / _cby James R. Shaw. _h[electronic resource]
260	3		_aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c2022
300			_ae-book contains 336 pages
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aContents Front Matter Copyright Page Dedication Preface Abbreviations 1 Introduction View chapter Part I The Bipartite Reading and the Role of Agreement James R. Shaw 2 The Justificatory Question (§185) View chapter 3 The Justificatory Investigation (X–§201) View chapter 4 The Grammatical Investigation (§§199–242) View chapter 5 Agreement (§§240–242) View chapter 6 The Twofold Investigation: Philosophical Methodology and the Tractatus View chapter Part II Wittgenstein and Meaning Skepticism James R. Shaw 7 Wittgenstein and Kripke View chapter 8 Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens View chapter 9 Dispositions: An Exegetical Aside View chapter 10 Notions of Uniformity: A “Wittgensteinean” Solution and Its Precursors View chapter 11 Relativism: Communities, Languages, and Forms of Life View chapter 12 Kripke v. Wittgenstein: Some Final Remarks View chapter End Matter Bibliography Index
520	3		_aAbstract This book offers a new “bipartite” reading of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following and the foundations of semantics in his seminal Philosophical Investigations. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s remarks are split between two logically distinct projects marked by different guiding questions, presuppositions, and methodologies. The attribution of this thoroughgoing bipartite structure resolves a number of internal tensions in the text, and reveals Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks on human agreement to exhibit a surprising attentiveness to, and plausible treatment of, a blurring of the semantics/metasemantics distinction arising in Wittgenstein’s treatment of foundational semantic questions. The book then turns to an extended engagement with Kripkensteinean meaning skepticism. While on the reading offered Wittgenstein never countenanced meaning skepticism, his work in the foundations of semantics gives us the resources to develop an unusual naive reply to the skeptic not yet explored in literature. It is argued that the Wittgensteinean reply is simple, effective, generalizable, and theoretically “light-weight,” so that a theorist of almost any stripe could in principle take it up. _cProvided by publisher.
600	1	0	_aWittgenstein, Ludwig, _d1889-1951.
650		0	_aMethodology.
650		0	_aRules (Philosophy)
650		0	_aLanguage and languages _xPhilosophy.
653	0	0	_aPhilosophy of Language
856	4	0	_3https://academic.oup.com/book/44654 _uhttps://academic.oup.com/book/44654 _yClick here
942			_2ddc _cEB