000			01765nam a22002537a 4500
999			_c57097 _d57097
003			IN-MiVU
005			20190904111901.0
006			m|||||o||d| 00| 0
007			cr uuu---uuuuu
008			180427s2012 xxu||||go|||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780511997747 ( e-book )
040			_aMAIN _beng _cN-MiVU
041	0		_aeng
100	1		_aStern, Robert
245	0	0	_aUnderstanding Moral Obligation : _bKant, Hegel, Kierkegaard [ electronic resource ] / _cby Robert Stern.
260			_bCambridge University Press, _c2012
440		0	_aModern European Philosophy
520			_aIn many histories of modern ethics, Kant is supposed to have ushered in an anti-realist or constructivist turn by holding that unless we ourselves 'author' or lay down moral norms and values for ourselves, our autonomy as agents will be threatened. In this book, Robert Stern challenges the cogency of this 'argument from autonomy', and claims that Kant never subscribed to it. Rather, it is not value realism but the apparent obligatoriness of morality that really poses a challenge to our autonomy: how can this be accounted for without taking away our freedom? The debate the book focuses on therefore concerns whether this obligatoriness should be located in ourselves (Kant), in others (Hegel) or in God (Kierkegaard). Stern traces the historical dialectic that drove the development of these respective theories, and clearly and sympathetically considers their merits and disadvantages; he concludes by arguing that the choice between them remains open.
650	1	0	_aPhilosophy
650	1	0	_aHistory of Philosophy
655		4	_aElectronic books
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511997747 _yhttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511997747 _zView to click
942			_2ddc _cEB