Voting and Collective Decision-Making : Bargaining and Power [ electronic resource ] / by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano.
By: Laruelle, Annick.
Contributor(s): Valenciano,Federico [joint author].
Material type:
TextPublisher: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2009ISBN: 9780511493553 ( e-book ).Subject(s): Politics and International Relations | Economics | Microeconomics | Comparative PoliticsGenre/Form: Electronic booksDDC classification: 324.601 Online resources: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493553 View to click Summary: Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E-Book
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WWW | 324.601 LAR/V (Browse shelf) | Available | EB252 |
Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
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