Shaw, James R., <br/><br/>
Wittgenstein on rules :  Justification, grammar, and agreement /  [electronic resource] 
by James R. Shaw. 
 - New York, NY :  Oxford University Press,  2022 
 - e-book contains 336 pages 
<br/><br/>Includes bibliographical references and index. 
<br/><br/>Contents<br/>Front Matter<br/>Copyright Page <br/>Dedication <br/>Preface <br/>Abbreviations <br/>1 Introduction <br/>View chapter<br/>Part I The Bipartite Reading and the Role of Agreement<br/>James R. Shaw<br/>2 The Justificatory Question (§185) <br/>View chapter<br/>3 The Justificatory Investigation (X–§201) <br/>View chapter<br/>4 The Grammatical Investigation (§§199–242) <br/>View chapter<br/>5 Agreement (§§240–242) <br/>View chapter<br/>6 The Twofold Investigation: Philosophical Methodology and the Tractatus <br/>View chapter<br/>Part II Wittgenstein and Meaning Skepticism<br/>James R. Shaw<br/>7 Wittgenstein and Kripke <br/>View chapter<br/>8 Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens <br/>View chapter<br/>9 Dispositions: An Exegetical Aside <br/>View chapter<br/>10 Notions of Uniformity: A “Wittgensteinean” Solution and Its Precursors <br/>View chapter<br/>11 Relativism: Communities, Languages, and Forms of Life <br/>View chapter<br/>12 Kripke v. Wittgenstein: Some Final Remarks <br/>View chapter<br/>End Matter<br/>Bibliography <br/>Index  
<br/><br/> Abstract<br/>This book offers a new “bipartite” reading of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following and the foundations of semantics in his seminal Philosophical Investigations. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s remarks are split between two logically distinct projects marked by different guiding questions, presuppositions, and methodologies. The attribution of this thoroughgoing bipartite structure resolves a number of internal tensions in the text, and reveals Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks on human agreement to exhibit a surprising attentiveness to, and plausible treatment of, a blurring of the semantics/metasemantics distinction arising in Wittgenstein’s treatment of foundational semantic questions. The book then turns to an extended engagement with Kripkensteinean meaning skepticism. While on the reading offered Wittgenstein never countenanced meaning skepticism, his work in the foundations of semantics gives us the resources to develop an unusual naive reply to the skeptic not yet explored in literature. It is argued that the Wittgensteinean reply is simple, effective, generalizable, and theoretically “light-weight,” so that a theorist of almost any stripe could in principle take it up. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9780197610015  GBP163.01 
<br/><br/><label>Standard No.: </label>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.001.0001  DOI: 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Personal Names: </label><br/>Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Methodology.<br/>Rules (Philosophy)<br/>Language and languages--Philosophy.
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Index Terms: </label>Philosophy of Language 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>192  / SHA/W