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Central Library - Vidyasagar University

“Education does not only mean learning, reading, writing, and arithmetic,

it should provide a comprehensive knowledge”

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Wittgenstein on rules : Justification, grammar, and agreement / by James R. Shaw. [electronic resource]

By: Shaw, James R [author.].
Material type: TextTextPublisher: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2022Description: e-book contains 336 pages.ISBN: 9780197610015.Subject(s): Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 | Methodology | Rules (Philosophy) | Language and languages -- Philosophy | Philosophy of LanguageDDC classification: 192 Online resources: https://academic.oup.com/book/44654 Click here
Contents:
Contents Front Matter Copyright Page Dedication Preface Abbreviations 1 Introduction View chapter Part I The Bipartite Reading and the Role of Agreement James R. Shaw 2 The Justificatory Question (§185) View chapter 3 The Justificatory Investigation (X–§201) View chapter 4 The Grammatical Investigation (§§199–242) View chapter 5 Agreement (§§240–242) View chapter 6 The Twofold Investigation: Philosophical Methodology and the Tractatus View chapter Part II Wittgenstein and Meaning Skepticism James R. Shaw 7 Wittgenstein and Kripke View chapter 8 Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens View chapter 9 Dispositions: An Exegetical Aside View chapter 10 Notions of Uniformity: A “Wittgensteinean” Solution and Its Precursors View chapter 11 Relativism: Communities, Languages, and Forms of Life View chapter 12 Kripke v. Wittgenstein: Some Final Remarks View chapter End Matter Bibliography Index
Abstract: Abstract This book offers a new “bipartite” reading of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following and the foundations of semantics in his seminal Philosophical Investigations. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s remarks are split between two logically distinct projects marked by different guiding questions, presuppositions, and methodologies. The attribution of this thoroughgoing bipartite structure resolves a number of internal tensions in the text, and reveals Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks on human agreement to exhibit a surprising attentiveness to, and plausible treatment of, a blurring of the semantics/metasemantics distinction arising in Wittgenstein’s treatment of foundational semantic questions. The book then turns to an extended engagement with Kripkensteinean meaning skepticism. While on the reading offered Wittgenstein never countenanced meaning skepticism, his work in the foundations of semantics gives us the resources to develop an unusual naive reply to the skeptic not yet explored in literature. It is argued that the Wittgensteinean reply is simple, effective, generalizable, and theoretically “light-weight,” so that a theorist of almost any stripe could in principle take it up. Provided by publisher.
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Non-fiction 192 SHA/W (Browse shelf) Available EB782

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents
Front Matter
Copyright Page
Dedication
Preface
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
View chapter
Part I The Bipartite Reading and the Role of Agreement
James R. Shaw
2 The Justificatory Question (§185)
View chapter
3 The Justificatory Investigation (X–§201)
View chapter
4 The Grammatical Investigation (§§199–242)
View chapter
5 Agreement (§§240–242)
View chapter
6 The Twofold Investigation: Philosophical Methodology and the Tractatus
View chapter
Part II Wittgenstein and Meaning Skepticism
James R. Shaw
7 Wittgenstein and Kripke
View chapter
8 Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens
View chapter
9 Dispositions: An Exegetical Aside
View chapter
10 Notions of Uniformity: A “Wittgensteinean” Solution and Its Precursors
View chapter
11 Relativism: Communities, Languages, and Forms of Life
View chapter
12 Kripke v. Wittgenstein: Some Final Remarks
View chapter
End Matter
Bibliography
Index

Abstract
This book offers a new “bipartite” reading of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following and the foundations of semantics in his seminal Philosophical Investigations. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s remarks are split between two logically distinct projects marked by different guiding questions, presuppositions, and methodologies. The attribution of this thoroughgoing bipartite structure resolves a number of internal tensions in the text, and reveals Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks on human agreement to exhibit a surprising attentiveness to, and plausible treatment of, a blurring of the semantics/metasemantics distinction arising in Wittgenstein’s treatment of foundational semantic questions. The book then turns to an extended engagement with Kripkensteinean meaning skepticism. While on the reading offered Wittgenstein never countenanced meaning skepticism, his work in the foundations of semantics gives us the resources to develop an unusual naive reply to the skeptic not yet explored in literature. It is argued that the Wittgensteinean reply is simple, effective, generalizable, and theoretically “light-weight,” so that a theorist of almost any stripe could in principle take it up. Provided by publisher.

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