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Game Theory and Economic Modelling [ electronic resource ] / by David M. Kreps.

By: Kreps, David M.
Material type: TextTextPublisher: Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003ISBN: 9780191596568 ( e-book ).Subject(s): EconomicsGenre/Form: Electronic booksDDC classification: 330.015193 Online resources: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198283814.001.0001 View to click Summary: Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.
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330.015193 KRE/G (Browse shelf) Available EB281

Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.

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