| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01685nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
IN-MiVU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20240429161457.0 |
| 006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS |
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| 007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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180406s2009 xxu||||go|||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
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| International Standard Book Number |
9780511522055 (e-book ) |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MAIN |
| Language of cataloging |
eng |
| Transcribing agency |
IN-MiVU |
| 041 0# - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
338.820151 |
| Item number |
PHI/C |
| Edition number |
21 |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Philips, Louis |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Competition Policy : |
| Remainder of title |
A Game-Theoretic Perspective [ electronic resource ] / |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Louis Philips. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2009. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy. |
| 650 10 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Economics |
| 650 10 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Industrial Economics |
| 655 #4 - INDEX TERM--GENRE/FORM |
|---|
| Genre/form data or focus term |
Electronic books |
| 856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055</a> |
| Link text |
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522055 |
| Public note |
Click to view |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
|
| Koha item type |
E-Book |
